Learn · The quantum threat

The quantum threat, explained

What the risk is, how it arises, what it would take, when it could arrive, what it affects, and how organisations should respond.

In short: a large, error-corrected quantum computer could break the public-key cryptography (RSA and elliptic-curve) that secures almost every digital system. Nobody knows exactly when such a machine will exist, but data copied today can be decrypted later, signatures could be forged, and replacing cryptography takes years. That is why regulators already expect organisations to plan the move to quantum-safe cryptography.

Last reviewed: 14 October 2026

1. What is the quantum threat?

The quantum threat is the risk that a cryptographically relevant quantum computer (CRQC) will make today’s public-key cryptography insecure. Public-key cryptography lets strangers on the internet agree secret keys and prove who they are. It underpins HTTPS websites, online banking, VPNs, email security, software updates, payment cards and digital identity.

The threat does not come from today’s quantum computers, which are far too small and error-prone. It comes from the fault-tolerant machines that several companies are now building, and from attackers who collect encrypted data in the meantime.

2. How today’s cryptography works

Two jobs public-key cryptography does on every secure connection1. Agree a secret keyECDH, X25519, RSAEncrypt the dataAES-256 (quantum-resistant)2. Prove identityRSA, ECDSA signaturesTrust the website or updateCertificates, code signingShor’s algorithmbreaks jobs 1 and 2Grover’s algorithm onlyweakens AES, which staysstrong at 256 bits
Every secure connection uses public-key cryptography for two jobs, and symmetric encryption such as AES for the data itself.
JobTypical algorithms todayEffect of a large quantum computer
Agreeing a secret key (key exchange)ECDH, X25519, RSA key transport, Diffie-HellmanBroken by Shor’s algorithm
Proving identity (digital signatures, certificates)RSA, ECDSA, EdDSABroken by Shor’s algorithm
Encrypting the data itselfAES, ChaCha20Weakened by Grover’s algorithm; 256-bit keys remain strong
Hashing and integritySHA-2, SHA-3Modestly weakened; longer outputs remain strong

3. Who and what is affected

Almost every organisation is affected, because public-key cryptography is built into the systems everyone uses. The table shows where it sits and what a quantum computer would put at risk.

SystemTypical cryptographyMain quantum risk
Websites and APIs (HTTPS/TLS)ECDHE key exchange; RSA or ECDSA certificatesHarvest now, decrypt later; impersonation
VPNs and remote accessIKE/IPsec or TLS with ECDH and RSAHarvest now, decrypt later
Certificates and PKIRSA and ECDSA certificate chainsForged certificates; long-lived root keys
Software and firmware updatesRSA or ECDSA code signingMalicious updates signed with forged keys
Email securityS/MIME and PGP with RSA or ECCStored email decrypted later
Remote administrationSSH host and user keysServer impersonation
Payments and banking messagingRSA and ECC in cards, HSMs and interbank linksFraud; long-lived financial data exposed
Digital identity and smart cardsRSA and ECC keys on cards and tokensCredential forgery
Blockchains and digital assetsECDSA and EdDSA signaturesTheft by forging transaction signatures
IoT and operational technologyOften fixed RSA or ECC in firmwareDevices that cannot be upgraded in time

4. What is not broken

Symmetric encryption such as AES-256 and hash functions such as SHA-384 and SHA-512 are expected to remain secure. Quantum computers also do not break the new post-quantum algorithms that NIST standardised in August 2024. See Standards.

5. How a quantum computer breaks it

Why RSA and elliptic curves are safe today

RSA is secure because multiplying two large prime numbers is easy, but working backwards from the product to the primes is extraordinarily hard. Elliptic-curve cryptography relies on a similar one-way problem called the discrete logarithm. The best classical methods grow so slowly that factoring a 2048-bit RSA key is far beyond any existing computer. For comparison, the largest RSA number factored publicly with classical computers, RSA-250 (829 bits) in 2020, took about 2,700 core-years of computing.

Shor’s algorithm, step by step

In 1994 the mathematician Peter Shor showed that a quantum computer could solve both problems efficiently. The trick is to turn factoring into a question about a repeating pattern, which quantum interference is very good at finding.

How Shor’s algorithm factors a number1CLASSICALTurn factoring intofinding the periodof a repeatingpattern2QUANTUMPut many inputs intosuperposition atonce3QUANTUMCompute therepeating functionon all of themtogether4QUANTUMQuantum Fouriertransform:interference revealsthe period5CLASSICALUse the period tocalculate the primefactors
Only steps 2 to 4 need a quantum computer. The quantum part finds the period of a repeating pattern; ordinary maths turns that period into the prime factors.
  • Step 1 (classical): pick a random number and set up a function that repeats with a hidden period. If you know the period, simple arithmetic gives you the factors.
  • Step 2 (quantum): place a register of qubits in superposition, so it represents a huge range of inputs at once.
  • Step 3 (quantum): compute the repeating function on all of those inputs together. This “modular exponentiation” is the most expensive part of the whole algorithm.
  • Step 4 (quantum): apply the quantum Fourier transform. Interference cancels out most outcomes and makes measurements cluster around values that reveal the period.
  • Step 5 (classical): use the period to compute the factors with a greatest-common-divisor calculation. The run is repeated a few times if needed.

A version of the same idea solves the elliptic-curve discrete logarithm problem, which breaks ECDH key exchange and ECDSA or EdDSA signatures.

Grover’s algorithm

Lov Grover’s 1996 algorithm speeds up brute-force search, roughly halving the effective strength of a symmetric key. AES-128 would offer about 64 bits of security against such an attack, while AES-256 would still offer about 128 bits, which is why long-term guidance recommends 256-bit keys. Grover’s algorithm is also hard to run in parallel, which limits its practical impact further.

6. What it would take

Shor’s algorithm needs a long, error-free calculation: billions of quantum operations in a row. No physical qubit is reliable enough for that, so the machine must use logical qubits, each built from many physical qubits through error correction. Three numbers describe the size of the machine needed:

  • Logical qubits: how much error-corrected working memory the algorithm needs.
  • Physical qubits: the actual hardware, including the qubits used for error correction and for producing special “magic states”.
  • Run time: how long the calculation takes, which depends on how fast error-correction cycles run.
Estimated physical qubits needed to break RSA-20482019Gidney & Ekerå20 million2025Gidney (Google)< 1 million2026Iceberg Quantum (claim, under review)< 100,000Logarithmic scale. All three assume 0.1% physical error rates and fast error correction.Today’s largest processors have hundreds to a few thousand physical qubits.
Better algorithms and error-correction techniques have cut the estimated size of an RSA-breaking machine by a factor of 20 in six years. The 2026 figure is a company’s claim that is still being examined.
EstimateTargetLogical qubitsPhysical qubitsRun time
Gidney and Ekerå (2019)RSA-2048—About 20 millionAbout 8 hours
Gidney, Google (May 2025)RSA-2048About 1,400Fewer than 1 millionLess than a week
Roetteler et al., Microsoft (2017)256-bit elliptic curveAbout 2,330——
Google Quantum AI (2026)256-bit elliptic curveFewer than 1,200 to 1,450——
Chevignard, Fouque, Schrottenloher (Eurocrypt 2026)256-bit elliptic curveAbout 1,100 to 1,200 (more operations)——

The physical-qubit estimates assume qubits with about a 0.1% error rate and error-correction cycles of around a microsecond, which is better than most of today’s hardware but within the range engineers are targeting. In 2026, the company Iceberg Quantum claimed RSA-2048 could be broken with fewer than 100,000 physical qubits using a different family of error-correcting codes; this claim needs hardware with more flexible qubit connections and is still being examined.

How far away is that from today?

Today (2026)Needed to break RSA-2048 (2025 estimate)
Physical qubits in the largest processorsHundreds to a few thousandFewer than 1 million
Error-corrected logical qubitsSmall-scale demonstrationsAbout 1,400 running for days
Error correction “below threshold”First shown by Google in December 2024Needed at very large scale

The gap is still large. But each step in the table is an engineering problem rather than an open question of physics, and companies such as IBM have published roadmaps to fault-tolerant machines with hundreds of logical qubits by the end of the decade.

7. When could it happen?

No one can give a date. The most widely cited expert survey, the Global Risk Institute’s Quantum Threat Timeline Report (published March 2026), found that experts put the chance of a CRQC within 10 years at 28–49% and within 15 years at 51–70%, the highest estimates in the survey’s history.

Mosca’s test: are you already late?x · years data must stay secrety · years to migratez · years until a capable quantum computerIf x + y extends past z, data is exposedYour exposureThe threat
Researcher Michele Mosca’s rule of thumb: if the time your data must stay secret plus the time your migration will take is longer than the time until a capable quantum computer exists, your data is already exposed.

Regulators have translated this uncertainty into deadlines: most expect high-risk systems to move to quantum-safe cryptography by around 2030 and everything else by 2035. See the Regulation Tracker.

8. How the threat plays out

Harvest now, decrypt later

Rows of server racks in a large data centre
Encrypted traffic and stored data can be copied today and kept until a capable quantum computer can read it. Image: Canva
TodayEncrypted data is copiedYears of storageThe data is still sensitiveA capable quantum computerThe stored data is decrypted
Encrypted data copied today can be stored and decrypted once a capable quantum computer exists.

Encrypted traffic and files can be copied now and stored. Anything that must stay confidential for many years, such as health records, financial data, trade secrets and government information, is already exposed. National security agencies have warned that well-resourced adversaries may already be collecting data this way.

Forged signatures, identities and updates

Once a CRQC exists, attackers could forge digital signatures: impersonating websites, issuing fake certificates, signing malicious software updates or approving fraudulent transactions. Systems with long-lived signing keys, such as certificate authorities and firmware update channels, need to change early.

Wider and systemic effects

  • Digital assets and payments: systems that rely on elliptic-curve signatures could see funds moved with forged transactions.
  • Signed records: contracts and audit trails protected by today’s signatures may become harder to rely on as evidence.
  • Financial stability: the G7 Cyber Expert Group warns that quantum computing could expose financial institutions’ data and that coordinating upgrades will take many years.
  • Migration risk: new implementations can contain bugs, such as the 2024 “KyberSlash” timing weaknesses reported in several Kyber implementations, and larger keys can break older equipment.
  • Long-lived devices: industrial systems, vehicles, medical devices and smart cards bought today may still be in service when attacks become possible.

9. How to respond

  • Govern. Make quantum risk a board-level topic with a named owner.
  • Discover. Build an inventory of where public-key cryptography is used, including in suppliers’ products.
  • Prioritise. Start with systems that protect long-lived data or act as roots of trust.
  • Migrate. Adopt the NIST standards (ML-KEM, ML-DSA, SLH-DSA), often in hybrid mode first.
  • Stay agile. Design systems so algorithms can be changed by configuration in future.

10. Common myths

MythReality
“Quantum computers can break all encryption.”They threaten public-key cryptography. Symmetric encryption with 256-bit keys and modern hash functions remain strong, and post-quantum algorithms are designed to resist them.
“It is decades away, so we can wait.”Experts give a substantial chance within 10 years, data stolen today is already at risk, and migration takes years.
“We need a quantum computer to protect ourselves.”No. Post-quantum cryptography runs on ordinary computers and is already available in mainstream software.
“Quantum key distribution is the answer.”For most organisations, security agencies recommend post-quantum cryptography rather than QKD, which needs special hardware and links.