FAQ
Quantum computing and PQC: frequently asked questions
Short, plain-English answers, reviewed and updated regularly.
Quantum computing basics
What is a quantum computer?
A quantum computer is a machine that processes information using qubits, which follow the rules of quantum physics. For certain problems, such as simulating molecules, it can work in ways that classical computers cannot efficiently copy.
What is a qubit?
A qubit is the basic unit of information in a quantum computer. A classical bit is always 0 or 1; a qubit can be in a combination of 0 and 1 until it is measured, when it gives an ordinary 0 or 1.
What are superposition and entanglement?
Superposition means a qubit holds a combination of 0 and 1. Entanglement means several qubits share one joint state, so they must be described together. Quantum algorithms use both, together with interference, to make useful answers likely.
Are quantum computers faster at everything?
No. They are expected to beat classical computers only on specific kinds of problems, such as simulating quantum systems and some mathematical problems including factoring. Most everyday software will run on classical computers.
What is the difference between a physical and a logical qubit?
A physical qubit is the actual hardware element, which makes errors. A logical qubit is built from many physical qubits using error correction, so it is far more reliable. Useful large-scale computations need logical qubits.
Why are many quantum computers kept so cold?
Superconducting qubits only work at temperatures about 10 to 20 thousandths of a degree (10 to 20 mK) above absolute zero, which shields them from heat that would destroy their quantum state. Other technologies, such as trapped ions and neutral atoms, use lasers and vacuum systems instead.
What is quantum advantage?
Quantum advantage means a quantum computer solves a problem better, faster or cheaper than the best classical methods. Researchers have reported early advantage on specialised physics problems; advantage on everyday business problems has not yet been shown.
The quantum threat
What is Q-Day?
Q-Day is the informal name for the day a quantum computer becomes powerful enough to break widely used public-key cryptography, such as RSA and elliptic-curve cryptography.
When will quantum computers break RSA?
There is no agreed date. In the Global Risk Institute’s latest expert survey (published March 2026), experts put the chance of a cryptographically relevant quantum computer within 10 years at 28–49%. Regulators plan around 2030 for high-risk systems and 2035 for the rest.
What does “harvest now, decrypt later” mean?
Attackers copy encrypted data today and store it until a quantum computer can decrypt it. Data that must stay confidential for many years is already at risk.
Which cryptography is at risk?
Public-key algorithms: RSA, elliptic-curve schemes (ECDSA, ECDH, EdDSA), Diffie-Hellman and DSA. They protect key exchange, signatures and certificates almost everywhere.
Is AES-256 still safe?
Yes. Symmetric encryption is far less exposed. AES-256 is still considered strong for long-term protection.
Can quantum computers break Bitcoin?
Bitcoin and many other blockchains use elliptic-curve signatures, which a large enough quantum computer could break, allowing funds to be stolen from exposed public keys. The hash functions they use are much less affected. Blockchain communities are discussing post-quantum upgrades.
Do we need to act now if large quantum computers are still years away?
It depends on two things: how long your data must stay confidential, and how long a migration would take you. Data that must stay secret for many years could be recorded today and decrypted later (see “harvest now, decrypt later” above), and large organisations often need years to find and replace cryptography across many systems. The free readiness assessment helps you judge where you stand.
Standards and solutions
What is post-quantum cryptography?
Post-quantum cryptography (PQC) is a set of algorithms designed to resist both classical and quantum computers. It runs on ordinary hardware and software. NIST published the first standards in August 2024.
What are ML-KEM, ML-DSA and SLH-DSA?
NIST’s first three post-quantum standards. ML-KEM (FIPS 203) agrees encryption keys. ML-DSA (FIPS 204) and SLH-DSA (FIPS 205) create digital signatures; SLH-DSA is a conservative, hash-based backup.
What is hybrid PQC?
Combining a traditional algorithm with a post-quantum one, so a connection stays secure as long as either holds. Major browsers and OpenSSL 3.5 already use hybrid key exchange.
Is quantum key distribution (QKD) an alternative?
For most organisations, no. QKD needs special hardware and links and does not solve authentication on its own. Security agencies such as the UK NCSC and US NSA point organisations to post-quantum cryptography.
Is post-quantum cryptography the same as quantum cryptography?
No. Post-quantum cryptography (PQC) means ordinary algorithms, running on today’s computers and software, that are designed to resist attacks from both classical and quantum computers. Quantum cryptography, such as quantum key distribution (QKD), uses quantum physics itself and needs special hardware.
Can we use post-quantum cryptography today?
In many cases, yes. NIST published its first three post-quantum standards, FIPS 203, 204 and 205, in August 2024, and software is starting to include them. For example, OpenSSL 3.5 adds ML-KEM, ML-DSA and SLH-DSA (see our news item). What you can switch on depends on your own products and suppliers, so ask them for their roadmap.
Are post-quantum keys and signatures bigger?
Yes. For example, an ML-KEM-768 public key is 1,184 bytes and its ciphertext is 1,088 bytes, compared with 32 bytes for an X25519 public key. Post-quantum signatures are generally larger than today’s too. This can affect network protocols, certificates, older devices and hardware security modules, which is why an inventory matters. Sources: BoringSSL ML-KEM header, RFC 7748.
Getting started
Where should a PQC migration start?
With a cryptographic inventory of where public-key cryptography is used, then ranking systems by data sensitivity, how long it must stay secret and how much depends on them.
What is a CBOM?
A cryptographic bill of materials: a structured, machine-readable record of the algorithms, keys, certificates, libraries and protocols in your systems.
What is crypto-agility?
The ability to change cryptographic algorithms through configuration rather than rebuilding systems.
Will we need new hardware?
Sometimes. Larger keys and signatures can affect older devices, HSMs, smart cards and network equipment. Your inventory will show where hardware must be replaced.
What do Hong Kong and New Zealand regulators say about post-quantum cryptography?
In Hong Kong, the HKMA published its first Quantum Preparedness Index for the banking sector on 27 July 2026 (sector score 2.3 out of 10) and is aiming for full readiness by 2030; see our HKMA analysis. In New Zealand, the NZISM (version 3.9, April 2025) has not yet approved any post-quantum algorithms, but asks agencies to inventory their cryptography, identify quantum-vulnerable systems and plan the transition; see the Regulation Tracker. This is official guidance as at our last review; the original sources are linked on those pages.
- NIST, Post-Quantum Cryptography standardization project (final standards FIPS 203, 204 and 205)
- Federal Register, NIST notice announcing FIPS 203, 204 and 205 (14 Aug 2024) (official notice)
- IETF RFC 7748, Elliptic Curves for Security (X25519) (final standard)
- BoringSSL ML-KEM header (source code documentation, ML-KEM-768 sizes)
- HKMA, quantum preparedness whitepaper and index (27 Jul 2026) (regulator press release)
- GCSB, NZISM section 2.4, Preparation for Post-Quantum Cryptography (government guidance)
- Global Risk Institute, Quantum Threat Timeline Report 2025 (expert survey; estimates, not predictions)
